UK House of Commons Report on Russia

It is interesting, that in the report of the House of Commons, it is recognized, that Saakashvili started the attack on South Ossetia on August 7, 2008, even though, according to the report, Georgia had previously been provoked by Russia.

I wonder why people still discuss who started the war, it is so obvious from simply following the chain of events. Georgian president Saakashvili says, that he ordered Georgian troops to go fight to stop imminent Russian invasion. The report seems to partly endorse this view.

However, according to this very table below, president Saakashvili declared “state of war” on August 8, somewhat not on August 7, when the war started in South Ossetia. Another question, I would ask Saakashvili is why to stop Russian invasion, Georgian troops had to attack Tkhinval, that lies tens of miles away from the Russian border. They could easily bypass the city, in fact the city had been practically surrounded by Georgian forces for a while.

Funny evidence, that the report provides from Georgia to explain why Georgians decided to fight against Russia, that is far stronger than Georgia goes: “We wanted to die for our country, rather than simply run away”…. Is this serious? Then why Georgia asked for peace on August 10? Two days after the Russians got involved? I don’t understand, if Georgians wanted to fight the Russians, they should have fought at least for couple of weeks, instead, they “wanted to die for their country”, but somewhat decided to surrender after couple of days.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/276/27606.htm#a19

Table 4: Timeline of the Georgia conflict and immediate lead-up in 2008
4 May Two Georgian UAVs shot down by Abkhazian forces, bringing the total to four since March.
5 May Georgian news agency reports of the construction of a new Russian military base for peacekeepers in Abkhazia.
26 May UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) confirms Georgian UAV shot down by Russian jet in Abkhazia on 20 April; Russian Foreign Minister claims video has ’serious inconsistencies’.
31 May Russia deploys 300 ‘unarmed’ soldiers to Abkhazia, claiming they are required for railway repair works. Georgia indicts Russia in planning a military intervention.
June Abkhazia breaks all ties with Georgian government
6-7 June Saakashvili and Medvedev meet, but agree that they cannot resolve ‘all of their problems’; Georgia declares the two sides must meet for a longer discussion.
14-15 June Reports of an ‘intensive’ exchange of fire outskirts of Tskhinvali between Georgian and South Ossetian troops.
17 June Four Russian peacekeepers detained in Abkhazia for allegedly transporting illegal ammunition; Russian Defence Ministry demands their return.
3-4 July Explosions in South Ossetia prompt Russia to accuse Georgia of military intervention and to condemn its ‘aggression’.
10 July In a press conference with President Saakashvili, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for an end to violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
29-30 July South Ossetia accuses Georgia of shelling villages outside of Tskhinvali. Georgia asserts that South Ossetians directed fire towards its monitoring group.
1 August Explosion in South Ossetia; Georgia reports injury of two policemen.
7 August Georgia sends in its military to Tskhinvali. Russia retaliates with military force.
8 August Both South Ossetia and Georgia lay claim to the disputed territory during intense shelling of Tskhinvali by both sides. Georgia accuses Russia of provoking ‘undeclared war.’ Russia warns Georgia that its ‘aggression’ will not go ‘unpunished.’
President Saakashvili declares a ’state of war.’

9 August Georgia claims to have shot down two Russian warplanes.
Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba claims Abkhaz forces have embarked upon an operation to drive Georgian forces out of the hotly-disputed Kodori gorge.

10 August Reports of bombs dropped outside of Tbilisi, near a military airport.
Russian diplomat reports death count of 2,000 in South Ossetia; the numbers have not been verified.

Georgia reports to have offered Russia a peace deal, saying it would withdraw its troops from South Ossetia. Russia denied any cessation of armed conflict by the Georgians, and demanded an unconditional withdrawal from South Ossetia.

Georgia reports death of 130 Georgian civilians and 1,165 injuries. Russia rejects the claim that it has hit civilians.

US President George W. Bush declares Russia’s troop build-up to be a ‘disproportionate response’; UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband denounces Russia’s bombing of targets ‘well beyond’ South Ossetia.

11 August Russia stationed more than 9,000 paratroopers in Abkhazia, thus exceeding the limit of 3,000 from the 1994 peace agreement. It continues to move more troops and armour across the border; there are reports that the movement also includes T-72 tanks and Hurricane rocket launchers.
European Commission calls on Russia to ’stop immediately all military activity on Georgian territory.’

Russia delivers an ultimatum to Georgia: that it must disarm 1,500 troops in Zugdidi, near Abkhazia, which Georgia rejects.

16 August President Medvedev signs six-point EU-brokered ceasefire, which includes a promise to withdraw troops to pre-conflict positions.
17 August Medvedev tells President Nicolas Sarkozy in a telephone conversation that Russian troops will begin to withdraw from Georgia on Monday 18th of August.
19 August Medvedev tells Sarkozy that—contrary to the EU ceasefire—Russian troops will remain in a buffer zone inside Georgia proper on the border with South Ossetia, and the remainder of troops will go back to South Ossetia and to Russia.
NATO freezes its partnership with Russia, and declares normal relations with Russia to be impossible. Statement issued by NAC (North Atlantic Council) emphasizes concern over Georgia’s territorial integrity and the humanitarian situation.

22 August Russia promises a ‘partial’ withdrawal of troops by the end of the day, but claims some “peacekeepers” will be left inside Georgia. US General Craddock calls the move ‘far too little, far too slow’.
26 August Russian President Medvedev formally recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and accuses Georgian President Saakashvili of using ‘genocide to solve his political problems.’

Peace plan project for South Ossetia

http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/10559

The Commission of National Reconciliation in South Ossetia could become a vital tool for reducing tensions and finding lasting political solutions in the region, argues journalist and analyst Valeriy Dzutsev.

All the sides of the August 2008 conflict in South Ossetia and Georgia as a result lost out either militarily or politically. Tbilisi lost control over the territories and suffered human and material losses. South Ossetia, also having suffered human and material losses, has not acquired international recognition and its state is still precarious. Russia suffered image losses among the CIS countries and found itself internationally isolated. The U.S. did not defend its loyal ally Georgia, as many in Georgia had expected it would.

Besides, there are strong reasons to believe, that no side has achieved what it wanted. Georgia did not regain control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, having lost even those territories, that it had controlled prior to August 2008. South Ossetia even though was recognized by Russia, has not become really an independent country, while its prospects for prosperity and security are almost as uncertain as they were before the latest war. Russia did not gain control over Georgia, that it likely desired, on the contrary all Georgian political forces are united on the question of lost territories and are very anti-Russian.

Op-Ed on South Ossetia that never made it to the media

Soon after August 2008 war in South Ossetia I tried to publish Op-Eds on the situation there. Either because my Op-Eds were so bad or I sent them to the first rank U.S. papers, they never were published. So I thought, why not to publish them at least in my blog, just for general information.

It has become common wisdom that the Russian government is to blame for every negative development inside Russia and in the surrounding countries. Still, I was astonished to observe how readily the American media followed the Georgian version of the conflict with Russia, without looking much into the substance of this story.

The bulk of the discussion focuses on geopolitics and hardly anyone asks the Ossetians, whose homes were destroyed at the beginning of this latest war in August, for their opinions and concerns. Meanwhile, the fighting has forced more than 30,000 South Ossetians to flee to Russia – the third wave of Ossetian refugees running from Georgia in the past century.

Report on fact-finding visit to Russian Caucasus – the media iron curtain

On 25 June Reporters Without Borders released the report of an investigation into the situation of the media in the Russian Caucasus, for which it visited Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia and met with Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (when he was still well, i.e. prior to an attempt on his life on 22 June), as well as local journalists and human rights activists.

http://www.rsf.org/spip.php?page=article&id_article=33591

I think, what is hard to assess during such a short mission is the long term trends in North Caucasus. The trend is that Russia uses all its means to isolate North Caucasus from the outside world. Killing off independent journalists and journalism as a whole is seen by the Kremlin as a natural step toward its goal of turning North Caucasus into a black hole, that no emits any officially unapproved information.

Iran elections

Attack on Yevkurov Shows Moscow no Longer Controls Events in the North Caucasus

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 120June 23, 2009 12:47 PM Age: 1 days
By: Valery Dzutsev

Police and military investigators examine the site of an explosion of a car carrying Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.
In the latest in an escalating series of attacks in the North Caucasus, a car carrying the president of Ingushetia, Yunus Bek-Yevkurov, was blown up on June 22. An estimated 70 kilograms of explosives detonated as the president’s motorcade was passing by in Nazran, the principal city in the republic. President Yevkurov’s driver and his bodyguard died in the attack and the president himself was badly wounded. He underwent surgery and was subsequently airlifted to a Moscow hospital (Interfax, June 22).

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Path to Freedom in North Caucasus

The choice is not yet made

By Valery Dzutsev, special to Prague Watchdog

Maryland, U.S.A.

Reply to Sergei Gligashvili

http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000024-000005-000007&lang=1

The intellectuals of the North Caucasus have an obligation to offer a democratic alternative to the fanatical cult of Moscow’s rule that is practiced by the regional elites, as well as to militant Islamism in North Caucasus. Neither an unreservedly pro-Moscow loyalist position nor the pursuit of jihadist ideology are in the long term interests of the region’s peoples, and they are leading to a dead end.

In his article The choice of unfreedom, Sergei Gligashvili puts his finger very neatly on the point of contact between the jihadism of Dokka Umarov’s Caucasus Emirate quasi-state and the version of post-Ichkerian Chechnya headed by Ramzan Kadyrov. The dilemma for neutral Chechens who have not yet made up their minds about their political allegiances is indeed not an enviable one. The choice is restricted to two systems: one is that of Kadyrov, who has proclaimed Moscow as a universal fetish, and the other is the Caucasus Emirate, which preaches a radical jihad that is not accepted by a significant part of the region’s population which has been educated in secular traditions and culture.

It is not only in Chechnya that the matrices of loyalism and jihadism have become the dominant political systems – in the past few years they have been reproduced in the other republics of the Northern Caucasus. The youth of the North Caucasus is faced with a bed of Procrustes: an ineluctable choice between two value systems that are equally unfree and totalitarian in their outlook, and this is the case in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachai-Cherkessia. A similar tension is felt to a somewhat lesser extent in Adygea and North Ossetia.

Like Mr. Gligashvili, I believe that were Russia to leave the North Caucasus today, this would not automatically lead to the establishment of a just and free political system in the region. Moreover, it is quite possible that of the two evils – Kadyrov and Umarov – the people of Chechnya would choose Kadyrov, as Islamist theocracy, at least in its Umarov form, is ontologically incompatible with any civil freedoms, public or private. While at the same time Kadyrov’s dictatorship may potentially evolve into a more flexible political system through being unified with Russia as a whole.


The Price of Victory

by Valery Dzutsev
18 June 2009

South Ossetia elects a parliament amid scandals, frustration, and growing tensions.

The laptop of a journalist from El Pais, seized by police as a suspected bomb and blown up in a field, could symbolize South Ossetia’s recent legislative election. Instead of helping settle conflicts within the territory, the 31 May election sparked accusations from the opposition and international condemnation, and reportedly failed to arouse the voters’ enthusiasm.

South Ossetia and its Russian backers won last August’s five-day war against Georgia. But as the tiny region held its first parliamentary elections since Moscow recognized it as an independent state, conflicts among local factions and a thinly-disguised power struggle between the South Ossetian government and Moscow heightened the internal tensions in a region badly in need of help to recover from the war’s high human and material costs.

continued here: http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=326&NrSection=4&NrArticle=20647&tpid=10